01315nam a22001697a 4500999001900000008004100019100002500060245005800085260003100143300002800174520067500202773003100877906002400908942000700932952010300939952010301042  c523648d523648230915b           ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aSturm, John  943731  aHow should sanctions account for bystander countries?  aAEA Papers and Proceedings  a113, May, 2023: p.39-42  aNeutral "bystander countries" have profoundly shaped the impact of trade sanctions imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. How should sanctions account for the presence of such bystanders? I study this question in a simple trade model where a sanctioning country places tariffs on imports from a sanctioned country in the presence of a neutral third country. Optimal tariffs-as-sanctions are lower on goods that the sanctioner can import from bystanders. On goods that the sanctionee can export to bystanders, tariffs-as-sanctions are higher given an elasticity of (excess) supply to the sanctioner but lower given a total elasticity of supply.- Reproduced   aAEA Papers and Proceedings  aFINANCIAL SANCTIONS  cAR  00102ddc40709398696aIIPAbIIPAd2023-09-15h113, May, 2023: p.39-42pAR129552r2023-09-15yAR  00102ddc40709398697aIIPAbIIPAd2023-09-15h113, May, 2023: p.39-42pAR129553r2023-09-15yAR