Marinovic, Iván and Szydlowski, Martin  <br/><br/>
Monitor reputation and transparency 

 - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics   
 - 15(4), Nov, 2023: p.1-67 
<br/><br/> We study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation concerns. The monitor faces a manager, who chooses how much to manipulate based on the monitor's reputation. Reputational incentives are strongest for intermediate reputations. Instead of providing transparency, the regulator's disclosure policy aims to keep the monitor's reputation intermediate, even at the cost of diminished incentives. Beneficial schemes feature random delay or noisy information. Schemes that feature verifiable disclosure destroy reputational incentives. The regulator discloses more aggressively when she has better enforcement tools.- Reproduced <br/><br/>https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20220006<br/> 
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Topical Terms: </label><br/>Regulator  Monitor  Reputation concerns  Manager  Manipulation  Reputational incentives  Intermediate reputation  Transparency  Disclosure policy  Diminished incentives  Random delay  Noisy information  Verifiable disclosure  Aggressive disclosure  Enforcement tools