01110pab a2200169 454500008004000000100001800040245005300058260000900111300001500120520062700135650001300762700002300775773001100798909001000809999001700819952010400836180718b2002   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aFeld, Lars P.  aTax evasion and voting: an experimental analysis  c2002  ap.197-221.  aThe puzzle of tax compliance is why people pay taxes instead of evading them: Given the low expected fines, rational taxpayers should underreport taxable income.  However, most taxpayers truthfully declare their income to the tax authorities, a behaviour that is usually explained by tax morale.  In this paper, we study in an experimental setting which factors shape tax morale.  The main result is that the higher legitimacy of an endogenous fine as compared to an exogenously determined find leads to higher tax compliance.  This result is robust to competing explanations like commitment and reciprocity. - Reproduced.  aTaxation  aTyran, Jean-Robert  aKyklos  a52599  c52599d52599  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hVolume no: 55, Issue no: 2pAR53029r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR