01273pab a2200133 454500008004000000100001800040245007300058260000900131300001300140362000800153520093800161650001801099773002201117180718b2002   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aYasheng Huang  aManaging Chinese bureaucrats : an institutional economic perspective  c2002  ap.61-79.  aMar  aConventional analysis of government typically focuses on `politics', that is, interests, conflicts or personalities.  But governing a country is not only a task of successfully governing its people but also an administrative task of managing subordinate officials.  This is a very relevant issue in a country such as China, with a massive bureaucracy.  The top `managers' of the country - some 30 national leaders - make policies but also manage a large number of bureaucratic personnel.  As in business organizations, control problems occur when subordinates have different interests from those of the organization and when the behavior of subordinates is imperfectly monitored.  Control mechanisms are designed to minimize such problems by either alligning interests or improving information.  This article uses this framework to explain a wide variety of administrative phenomena in Chinese government organizations. - Reproduced.  aCivil service  aPolitical Studies