Public information is an incentive for politicians: Experimental evidence from Delhi elections
- American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
- 16(3), Jul, 2024: p.323-353
This study examines how public information influences political behavior using a randomized experiment involving Delhi municipal councillors. Two years before elections, selected councillors were informed they would be publicly evaluated via newspaper report cards. Those in high-slum areas significantly increased pro-poor spending compared to both untreated peers and treated councillors from low-slum areas. Councillors barred from rerunning in their home wards due to gender quotas were more likely to contest elsewhere if their report cards reflected strong pro-poor performance. Political parties also gained electorally from such spending. A cross-cut experiment revealed that councillors did not respond to private, undisclosed information, underscoring the power of public visibility in shaping political incentives. :Two years prior to elections, two-thirds of Delhi municipal councillors learned they had been randomly chosen for a prelection newspaper report card. Treated councillors in high-slum areas increased pro-poor spending, relative both to control counterparts and treated counterparts from low-slum areas. Treated incumbents ineligible to rerun in home wards because of randomly assigned gender quotas were substantially likelier to run elsewhere only if their report card showed a strong pro-poor spending record. Parties also benefited electorally from councillors' high pro-poor spending. In contrast, in a cross-cut experiment, councillors did not react to actionable information that was not publicly disclosed. Reproduced