Coats, Jennifer C. <br/><br/>
Applications of principal agent models to government contracting and accountability decision making 

 -  2002 
 - p.441-61. 
<br/><br/> This paper surveys literature from Economics, Accounting, and Management to address theoretical issues in Public Administration regarding government provided services in order to contribute to a formal connection between principal agent models in these disciplines and public policy administration decision-making.  In particular, it addresses the question: What theoretical properties of the services themselves might guide (a) the choice of producer of the services (government or outsourcing firm/contractor), and (b) the accountability imposed for the work produced.  It is found that a theoretical framework of principal-agent models that includes the decision of whether to contract out can be useful as a first step in systematically formulating the government's decision for a variety of goods/services.  This provides an alternative to the identification of key decision properties "from the ground up" for each good or service the government provides. - Reproduced. 
<br/><br/><label>Subjects--Topical Terms: </label><br/>Accountability<br/>Decision making<br/>Public administration