01483pab a2200169 454500 180718b2002 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d Coats, Jennifer C. Applications of principal agent models to government contracting and accountability decision making 2002 p.441-61. This paper surveys literature from Economics, Accounting, and Management to address theoretical issues in Public Administration regarding government provided services in order to contribute to a formal connection between principal agent models in these disciplines and public policy administration decision-making. In particular, it addresses the question: What theoretical properties of the services themselves might guide (a) the choice of producer of the services (government or outsourcing firm/contractor), and (b) the accountability imposed for the work produced. It is found that a theoretical framework of principal-agent models that includes the decision of whether to contract out can be useful as a first step in systematically formulating the government's decision for a variety of goods/services. This provides an alternative to the identification of key decision properties "from the ground up" for each good or service the government provides. - Reproduced. Accountability Decision making Public administration International Journal of Public Administration 52785 52785 52785 0 0 0 0 IIPA IIPA 2018-07-19 Volume no: 25, Issue no: 4 AR53215 2018-07-19 2018-07-19 AR