01599pab a2200181 454500008004000000100002300040245010400063260000900167300001400176520098000190650001901170650002001189650002601209773005101235909001001286999001701296952010401313180718b2002   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aCoats, Jennifer C.  aApplications of principal agent models to government contracting and accountability decision making  c2002  ap.441-61.  aThis paper surveys literature from Economics, Accounting, and Management to address theoretical issues in Public Administration regarding government provided services in order to contribute to a formal connection between principal agent models in these disciplines and public policy administration decision-making.  In particular, it addresses the question: What theoretical properties of the services themselves might guide (a) the choice of producer of the services (government or outsourcing firm/contractor), and (b) the accountability imposed for the work produced.  It is found that a theoretical framework of principal-agent models that includes the decision of whether to contract out can be useful as a first step in systematically formulating the government's decision for a variety of goods/services.  This provides an alternative to the identification of key decision properties "from the ground up" for each good or service the government provides. - Reproduced.  aAccountability  aDecision making  aPublic administration  aInternational Journal of Public Administration  a52785  c52785d52785  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hVolume no: 25, Issue no: 4pAR53215r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR