01813nam a22001697a 4500999001900000008004100019100005000060245010900110260002700219300003200246520110900278650009401387773002701481906002101508942000701529952010701536  c528111d528111241112b           ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aMughan, Sîan and Overstreet, Dallin 959493  aCan local government mergers reduce costs when capital expenditures are low: Evidence from court mergers  aUrban Affairs Review    a60(3), May, 2024: p.892-922  aLocal government mergers, motivated by promises of cost savings via economies of scale (EoS) and reduced duplication of function, often fail to produce the anticipated savings. An inability or unwillingness to reduce personnel costs is often offered as a reason for this outcome. We explore this explanation by estimating the expenditure effects of court mergers in California. Our main result is that current judicial spending (total expenditures minus capital expenditures) increases significantly following consolidation. This is partially explained by a sustained increase in salaries paid to full-time workers. The number of workers increases in the years immediately following merger however over the long-term merger has no effect on employment levels, suggesting that mergers change the composition of the workforce. These findings have implications for all local governments that provide labor-intensive services, if mergers are to reduce expenditures officials must be willing to make difficult personnel decisions.- Reproduced 

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/10780874231209908
  aLocal government consolidation, Expenditures, Municipal courts, Synthetic  control948661  aUrban Affairs Review    aLOCAL GOVERNMENT  cAR  00102ddc40709403190aIIPAbIIPAd2024-11-12h60(3), May, 2024: p.892-922pAR133538r2024-11-12yAR