00932nam a22001457a 4500 530690 530690 250709b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d Buccella, Domenico and Fanti, Luciano 54919 Bargaining agendas as strategic tools The Indian Journal of Labour Economics 68(1), Jan- Mar, 2025: p.99-118 In a unionized Cournot duopoly, the present paper re-examines the subject of the bargaining scope (only wages; wages and employment levels) between firms and unions. Given the potential market deterrence effect of the efficient bargaining model, the conventional wisdom that this agenda is socially efficient can be reversed. - Reproduced https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41027-025-00565-1 efficient bargaining, right to manage, cournot duopoly, firm- union bargaining agenda 54920 AR 0 0 ddc 0 0 405886 IIPA IIPA 2025-07-09 AR136483 2025-07-09 AR