<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<record
    xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
    xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim http://www.loc.gov/standards/marcxml/schema/MARC21slim.xsd"
    xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim">

  <leader>01602nam a22001337a 4500</leader>
  <datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="c">532902</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">532902</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <controlfield tag="008">260401b           ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d</controlfield>
  <datafield tag="100" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Garica, Gustavo A. Posso, Christian and Arango, Salome</subfield>
    <subfield code="9">59910</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a"> Minimum-wage effects, compliance, and firm size in a developing economy: Evidence from Colombia</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="260" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">The Developing Economies </subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a"> 63(4), Dec, 2025: p.301-327</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Minimum-wage legislation is a standard policy in most developing countries. Nonetheless, the consequences of increases in the minimum-wage are not conclusive. This paper examines the heterogeneous effects of minimum-wage, considering the imperfect enforcement of minimum-wage policy and different compliance levels across the firm sizes and types of workers, analyzing the Colombian case. Our identification strategy uses policy circumstances to set the minimum-wage associated with arbitrary decisions not explained by the fundamentals determining the minimum-wage. Using instrumental variable techniques, we show that a 10% increase in the minimum-wage reduces the employment rate by 1.27 percentage points and 0.70 percentage points in the proportion of hours worked. Consistent with a theoretical model of minimum-wage policy with imperfect competition and enforcement, the negative minimum-wage effect is larger in firms with higher levels of compliance&#x2014;that is, medium- and large-sized firms, and within these, the unskilled workers are the most affected.- Reproduced 


https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/deve.12443</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">The Developing Economies </subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="942" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="c">AR</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="0">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="1">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="2">ddc</subfield>
    <subfield code="4">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="7">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="9">408077</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="b">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">2026-04-01</subfield>
    <subfield code="h"> 63(4), Dec, 2025: p.301-327</subfield>
    <subfield code="p">AR138418</subfield>
    <subfield code="r">2026-04-01</subfield>
    <subfield code="y">AR</subfield>
  </datafield>
</record>
