01505pab a2200205 454500008004000000100002400040245007600064260000900140300001300149362000800162520087300170650002201043650002001065650002601085650001401111773004301125909001001168999001701178952010401195180718b2002   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aLehoucq, Fabrice E.  aCan parties police themselves? Electoral governance and democratization  c2002  ap.29-46.  aJan  aThis article outlines the logic and consequences of the classic theory of electoral governance.  By empowering the executive with the administration of elections and the legislature with the certification of the vote tally, the theory expected elected officials to generate widely acceptable election results.  This article argues that the classical theory breaks down when the same party controls the executive and the legislature.  Developments in several presidential systems offer tentative support for its central hypothesis.  Only when parties delegated election governance to an autonomous court system did election conflicts stop promoting political instability.  Comparisons between US and Latin American separation of power systems also suggest that political developments in North and South America are much more similar than commonly assumed. - Reproduced.  aPolitical parties  aDemocratization  aPublic administration  aElections  aInternational Political Science Review  a54589  c54589d54589  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hVolume no: 23, Issue no: 1pAR55034r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR