01730pab a2200193 454500008004000000100002000040245008200060260000900142300001600151362000800167520111600175650001901291650003501310650002601345773003401371909001001405999001701415952010401432180718b2002   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aBowman, John R.  aEmployers and the persistence of centralized wage setting: the case of Norway  c2002  ap.995-1026.  aNov  aRecent research indicates that centralised collective bargaining institutions are more resilient than predicted by the conventional wisdom, which viewed them as incompatible with new competitive conditions and new production strategies.  Drawing on a case study of Norway, the author argues that one reason for this resilience is that centralized wage setting may be actively supported by employers because it serves important employer interests.  It has helped moderate wage growth, reduced transaction costs, contributed to stable industrial relations, and provided political leverage for employer organizations.  The author also argues that institutional change must be viewed in terms of its economic and institutional context.  There has been some formal devolution of bargaining capacity to the level of the individual firm in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark.  However, these changes have been accompanied by institutioal changes, instigated by employers, that have increased the coordinating capacity of labor market actors. Labor markets in all three countries remain highly institutionalized. - Reproduced.  aWages - Norway  aCollective bargaining - Norway  aCollective bargaining  aComparative Political Studies  a54932  c54932d54932  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hVolume no: 35, Issue no: 9pAR55377r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR