01576pab a2200169 454500 180718b2002 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d Sherman, Richard Delegation, ratification, and U.S. trade policy: why divided government causes lower tariffs 2002 p.1171-197. Dec Recent research on executive-legislative relations concludes that divided government causes higher tariffs and inhibits international cooperation. I find that divided government leads to lower U.S. tariffs in the postwar period and that the theoretical connection between divided government and international cooperation is viable only as a special case. In the contemporary United States, trade policy preferences do not adhere to party lines: Democratic Congresses are more protectionist than Republican Congresses, but Democratic presidents are less protectionist than their Republican counterparts. The divergence of executive-legislative preferences is thus greater under unified government than under divided overnment. As a cross-national hypothesis, the claim that divided government inhibits international cooperation holds only if some special restrictions on partisan preferences are met. These conditions are unlikely to survive as generalizations about democratic polities, rendering implausible the connection between divided government and reduced international cooperation. - Reproduced. United States - Commerce Trade Comparative Political Studies 54938 54938 54938 0 0 0 0 IIPA IIPA 2018-07-19 Volume no: 35, Issue no: 10 AR55383 2018-07-19 2018-07-19 AR