01693pab a2200181 454500008004000000100002100040245009700061260000900158300001600167362000800183520111500191650002901306650001001335773003401345909001001379999001701389952010501406180718b2002   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aSherman, Richard  aDelegation, ratification, and U.S. trade policy: why divided government causes lower tariffs  c2002  ap.1171-197.  aDec  aRecent research on executive-legislative relations concludes that divided government causes higher tariffs and inhibits international cooperation.  I find that divided government leads to lower U.S. tariffs in the postwar period and that the theoretical connection between divided government and international cooperation is viable only as a special case.  In the contemporary United States, trade policy preferences do not adhere to party lines: Democratic Congresses are more protectionist than Republican Congresses, but Democratic presidents are less protectionist than their Republican counterparts.  The divergence of executive-legislative preferences  is thus greater under unified government than under divided  overnment.  As a cross-national hypothesis, the claim that divided government inhibits international cooperation holds only if some special restrictions on partisan preferences are met.  These conditions are unlikely to survive as generalizations about democratic polities, rendering implausible the connection between divided government and reduced international cooperation. - Reproduced.  aUnited States - Commerce  aTrade  aComparative Political Studies  a54938  c54938d54938  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hVolume no: 35, Issue no: 10pAR55383r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR