01260pab a2200193 454500008004000000100001800040245008100058260000900139300001400148362001100162520068200173650001800855650001000873700001800883773003400901909001000935999001700945952010400962180718b2003   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aGhosh, Saibal  aAre basel capital standards pro-cyclical? Some empirical evidence from India  c2003  ap.777-84.  a22 Feb  aThe debate on bank capital regulation has in recent years devoted specific attention to the role that bank loan loss provisions play as a part of the overall minimum capital regulatory framework. The new Capital Accord is also attempting to address provisioning practices within a broad capital regulatory framework. This paper contributes to the debate by exploring the available evidence about bank loan loss provisioning in the Indian context. Using data on state-owned banks for the period 1997-2002, we find that banks tend to delay provisioning for bad loans until too late, possibly magnifying the impact of the economic cycles on their income and capital. - Reproduced.  aBanks - India  aBanks  aNachane, D.M.  aEconomic and Political Weekly  a55771  c55771d55771  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hVolume no: 38, Issue no: 8pAR56216r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR