01401pab a2200133 454500008004000000100002100040245012500061260000900186300001500195362000800210520099300218650002201211773003401233180718b2003   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aMukherjee, Bumba  aPolitical parties and the size of government in multiparty legislatures: examining cross-country and panel data evidence  c2003  ap.699-728.  aAug  aThis article tests the effect of an increase in the number of represented political parties and the size of the majority party on the size of government - proxied by central government expenditure as a percentage of GDP - in multiparty legislatures. The author argues that an increase in the number of represented parties leads to higher central government expenditure. Conversely, as the size of the majority party grows from a bare-minimum majority to above the supermajority level, it has a nonlinear, specifically "cube" effect on central government expenditure. Panel data on central government expenditure from 110 countries are used to test these arguments. The results corroborate the theoretical claims and are robust in regression models where fixed-effects were introduced and endogeneity was corrected. Finally, an increase in the number of represented parties leads to higher government spending on subsidies and transfers but to lower spending on public goods. - Reproduced.  aPolitical parties  aComparative Political Studies