01331pab a2200133 454500008004000000100001600040245005000056260000900106300001400115520096600129650003601095650002801131773003801159180718b2004   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aSingh, M.P.  aFederal division of responsibilities in India  c2004  ap.107-17.  aThere would appear to be a good case for the "constitutionalization" of intergovernmental forums with a reasonable degree of parliamentary and legislative control from the two levels of governments. With declining investment by the state in the economy and the emerging profile of a federal regulatory state in place of the bureaucratic state, a new partnership between the state, the civil society, and the market needs to be forged. What is required is: (a) constitutional entrenchment of the NDC, like the ISC, as the major line organizations of intergovernmental `executive federalism' (b) Streamlining of the two staff agencies of executive federalism, namely, the Finance Commission and the Planning Commission. (c) Implementation of the entire spectrum of party system reforms recommended by the Venkatachaliah Commission Report (d) Setting up of a constitutional commission on the taxation system as recommended by the Sarkaria Commission. (Reproduced).  aIndia - Politics and government  aPolitics and government  aIndian Journal of Federal Studies