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  <controlfield tag="008">180718b2004   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d</controlfield>
  <datafield tag="100" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Gordillo, Gustavo</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">From policy lessons to policy actions: motivation to take evaluation seriously</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="260" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="c">2004</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">p.305-20.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="362" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Oct</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">The purpose of this article is to analyse the institutional aspects of creating effective systems for monitoring and evaluations (M&amp;E) in government-led rural development efforts in developing countries. We argue that the ultimate challenge of creating effective M&amp;E systems for public policy is not only related to the supply of information and the delivery of new knowledge to policy makers, but more importantly to their demand for lessons learnt about the effects of earlier policies. The challenge, then, is for governments to construct institutional arrangements that support the transformation of policy lessons into policy actions. This article shows that the likelihood of this transformation is closely related to the capacity of institutions to deliver mechanisms for downward accountability and processes for organisational learning. We add to earlier work in this area by considering the conditions under which such a transformation process is more or less likely, given the severe power and information asymmetries that characterise the institutional context of many developing countries' national governments. We use the tools of institutional analysis to examine the incentive structures of the actors involved in two concrete field settings, and assess to what extent these actors are likely to take evaluations seriously. - Reproduced.</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Motivation</subfield>
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    <subfield code="a">Public policy</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="700" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Andersson, Krister</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="773" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Public Administration and Development</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="909" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">62919</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="c">62919</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">62919</subfield>
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    <subfield code="0">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="1">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="4">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="7">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="b">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="h">Volume no: 24, Issue no: 4</subfield>
    <subfield code="p">AR63369</subfield>
    <subfield code="r">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="w">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="y">AR</subfield>
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