01098pab a2200145 454500008004000000100002300040245004500063260000900108300001300117362000800130520075300138650001300891650001000904773003800914180718b2005   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aTollepsen, Deborah  aLet's Pretend' children and joint action  c2005  ap.75-97.  aMar  aAccording to many, joint intentional action must be understood in terms of joint intentions. Most accounts of joint intention appeal to a set of sophisticated individual intentional states. The author argues that standard accounts of joint intention exclude the possibility of joint action in young children because they presuppose that the participants have a robust theory of mind, something young children lack. But young children do engage in joint action. The author offers a revision of Michael Bratman's analysis of joint intention that reflects the socio-cognitive abilities young children do have. This revision makes sense of joint action among young children and equally well explains simple joint actions involving adults. - Reproduced.  aChildren  aYouth  aPhilosophy of the Social Sciences