01270pab a2200145 454500008004000000100002500040245011800065260000900183300001400192362000800206520083000214650001901044650002701063773003401090180718b2005   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aSaiegh, Sebastian M.  aDo countries have a "democratic advantage"? Political institutions multilateral agencies, and sovereign borrowing  c2005  ap.366-87.  aMay  aThis article examines the effect of political institutions on countries' risk characteristics and the role that domestic political institutions pay in determining the interest rates charged to less developed countries. According to the "democratic advantage" argument, democracies should pay lower interest rates than authoritarian regimes because they are better able to make credible commitments. The author argues that such a claim must be revised in the case of developing countries. The results presented in this article support this assertion. First, they show that democracies are more likely to reschedule their debts, so they have no advantage; rather, the opposite is true. Second, there does not appear to be a significant difference between the interest rates paid by democracies and nondemocracies. - Reproduced.  aInterest rates  aPolitical institutions  aComparative Political Studies