00807pab a2200157 454500 180718b2005 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d D'Souza, Errol Are retrenchment laws inefficient? 2005 p.939-44. Oct-Dec It is argued that anti-retrenchment laws end up hurting the workers they were designed to project because firms decrease their demand for labour in anticipation of surplus labour during downturns. If free contracting between workers and firms is allowed we show in an efficiency wage set up that both firms and workers can behave opportunisitically requiring third-party enforcement of employment protection legislation. - Reproduced. Labour Indian Journal of Labour Economics 68915 68915 68915 0 0 0 0 IIPA IIPA 2018-07-19 Volume no: 48, Issue no: 4 AR69371 2018-07-19 2018-07-19 AR