01251pab a2200181 454500008004000000100001800040245011000058260000900168300001500177362000800192520065200200650003700852650001500889773003400904909001000938999001700948952010400965180718b2006   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aJacobi, Tonja  aThe senatorial courtesy game: explaining the norm of information vetoes in advice and consent nominations  c2006  ap.193-217.  aMay  aDespite the contentiousness of advice and consent nominations, the Senate usually rejects a candidate to whom a home senator objects. Using game theory, this article explains the persistence of senatorial courtesy and maps its effects on which candidates succeed. The greater salience of a home nomination allows retaliation and reciprocity in a repeated game to elicit support for a veto, even under adverse conditions. Comparative statics indicate the range of the president's feasible nominees and show which players gain and lose from the practice. Most notably, the president can benefit from an exercise of senatorial courtesy. - Reproduced.  aUnited States. Congress - Senate  aParliament  aLegislative Studies Quarterly  a69075  c69075d69075  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hVolume no: 30, Issue no: 2pAR69531r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR