00975pab a2200145 454500008004000000100001800040245007300058260000900131300001400140520056800154650001600722700002400738700002000762773004700782180718b2007   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aAnthon, Signe  aA bureaucrats procurement strategy: budget constraints and rationing  c2007  ap.221-44.  aWe investigate a bureaucratic principal responsible for the procurement of goods and services from private agents. the bureaucrat is evaluated on output and controlled by a limited budget. The agents maximize profit, have private information about variable production costs, and have positive outside options which are lost upon acceptance of a procurement contract. The setting is relevant for, e.g. governmental agencies. We show how this setup makes probabilistic rationing and overproduction for low-cost agents a useful tool for the bureaucrat. - Reproduced.  aBureaucracy  aThorsen, Jellesmark  aBogetoft, Peter  aAnnals of Public and Cooperative Economics