01044pab a2200181 454500 180718b2007 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d Anthon, Signe A bureaucrats procurement strategy: budget constraints and rationing 2007 p.221-44. We investigate a bureaucratic principal responsible for the procurement of goods and services from private agents. the bureaucrat is evaluated on output and controlled by a limited budget. The agents maximize profit, have private information about variable production costs, and have positive outside options which are lost upon acceptance of a procurement contract. The setting is relevant for, e.g. governmental agencies. We show how this setup makes probabilistic rationing and overproduction for low-cost agents a useful tool for the bureaucrat. - Reproduced. Bureaucracy Thorsen, Jellesmark Bogetoft, Peter Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics N 74758 74758 74758 0 0 0 0 IIPA IIPA 2018-07-19 Volume no: 78, Issue no: 2 AR75218 2018-07-19 2018-07-19 AR