01056pab a2200145 454500008004000000100001900040245005700059260000900116300001200125362000800137520070000145650001800845700002600863773002100889180718b2008   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aKonrad, Kai A.  aTime consistency and bureaucratic budget competition  c2008  ap.1-15.  aJan  aHigh employment protection in the public sector results in strategic over-employment if government divisions compete for budgets in a dynamic setting. Bureaucrats who are interested in maximising their divisions output employ excess labour, since this induces the sponsor to provide complementary inputs in the future. Restrictions on hiring decisions in the public sector can be regarded as provisions to reduce strategic hiring. We also provide evidence from a survey of decision makers in a public sector bureaucracy with very high employment protection. The results confirm that decision makers are aware of the strategic effects of their hiring decisions on budget allocation. - Reproduced.  aCivil service  aKessing, Sebastian G.  aEconomic Journal