01174pab a2200193 454500 180718b2008 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d Delfgaauw, Josse Incentives and workers' motivation in the public sector 2008 p.171-91. Jan Civil servants have a reputation for being lazy. However, people's personal experiences with civil servants frequently run counter to the stereotype. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in pub lic service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions. When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public sector highly attractive and may crowd out dedicated workers. When effort is verifiable, a cost-minimising government optimally attracts dedicated workers as well as the economy's laziest workers by offering separating contracts, which are both distorted. - Reproduce Motivation Public sector Dur, Robert Economic Journal N 77869 77869 77869 0 0 0 0 IIPA IIPA 2018-07-19 Volume no: 118, Issue no: 525 AR78329 2018-07-19 2018-07-19 AR