01293pab a2200205 454500008004000000100002100040245006000061260000900121300001400130362000800144520072500152650001500877650001800892700001600910773002100926908000600947909001000953999001700963952010700980180718b2008   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aDelfgaauw, Josse  aIncentives and workers' motivation in the public sector  c2008  ap.171-91.  aJan  aCivil servants have a reputation for being lazy. However, people's personal experiences with civil servants frequently run counter to the stereotype. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in pub lic service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions. When civil servants' effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public sector highly attractive and may crowd out dedicated workers. When effort is verifiable, a cost-minimising government optimally attracts dedicated workers as well as the economy's laziest workers by offering separating contracts, which are both distorted. - Reproduce  aMotivation  aPublic sector  aDur, Robert  aEconomic Journal  aN  a77869  c77869d77869  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hVolume no: 118, Issue no: 525pAR78329r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR