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  <controlfield tag="008">180718b2008   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d</controlfield>
  <datafield tag="100" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Forest, Virginie</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Performance-related pay and work motivation: theoretical and empirical perspectives for the French civil service</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="260" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="c">2008</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">p.325-39.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="362" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Jun</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">a time when the civil services of most OECD countries have embarked on a process of modernization of their practices, we are questioning the relevance of introducing performance-related pay systems, particularly in view of the, more often than not, negative effects on the work motivation of civil servants. The French civil service has recently decided to pay a part of its public officials on the basis of their performance, and we show how these individualized remuneration practices can, in the long term, undermine the public service motivations that drive some civil servants. Our reasoning is supported by the empirical results of studies conducted in the United States, in England and also in France, as well as  on the developments of intrinsic motivation theories, combined with the developments of the public service motivation theory. - Reproduced.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Performance appraisal - France</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Motivation - France</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Civil service - France</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">Civil service</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">International Review of Administrative Sciences</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="908" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">N</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="909" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="a">79016</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="c">79016</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">79016</subfield>
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  <datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
    <subfield code="0">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="1">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="4">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="7">0</subfield>
    <subfield code="a">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="b">IIPA</subfield>
    <subfield code="d">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="h">Volume no: 74, Issue no: 2</subfield>
    <subfield code="p">AR79476</subfield>
    <subfield code="r">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="w">2018-07-19</subfield>
    <subfield code="y">AR</subfield>
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