01436pab a2200169 454500008004000000100002100040245008200061260000900143300001600152362000800168520096800176650003001144650002201174650001401196700002201210773003401232180718b2008   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aNooruddin, Irfan  aUnstable politics: fiscal space and electoral volatility in the Indian states  c2008  ap.1069-091.  aAug  aWhat explains variations in electoral volatility? The authors argue that fiscal space - availability of financial resources to enact policy initiatives and provide public programs - possessed by governments can explain the level of electoral volatility. Where governments have fiscal space, citizens reward incumbent parties with their continued support. But when fiscal space is constrained, the incumbent government's ability to provide state resources is drastically reduced. Citizens are therefore less likely to reward the party at the polls and are available to opposition politicians and alternative appeals. Vote-switching ensures, and the incumbent government is voted out of the office. The authors test this argument and others in the existing literature on electoral returns from state assembly elections across 15 major Indian states from 1967 to 2004. The results support the argument that fiscal space influences electoral volatility. - Reproduced.  aPolitical parties - India  aElections - India  aElections  aChhibber, Pradeep  aComparative Political Studies