01216pab a2200181 454500008004000000100001800040245008700058260000900145300001500154362000800169520067300177650001800850773002900868908000600897909001000903999001700913952010400930180718b2009   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aleaver, Clare  aBureaucratic minimal squawk behavior: theory and evidence from regulatory agencies  c2009  ap.572-607.  aJun  aThis paper develops a model in which a desire to avoid criticism prompts otherwise public-spirited bureaucrats to behave inefficiently. Decisions are taken to keep interest groups quiet and to keep mistakes out of the public eye. The policy implications of this "minimal squqawk" behavior are at odds with the view that agencies should be structured to minimize the threat of "capture". An empirical test using data from US State Public Utility Commissions rejects the capture hypothesis and is consistent with the squawk hypothesis: longer PUC terms of office are associated with a higher incidence of rate reviews and lower household electricity bills. - Reproduced.  aCivil service  aAmerican Economic Review  aN  a83570  c83570d83570  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hVolume no: 99, Issue no: 3pAR84030r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR