01467pab a2200217 454500008004000000100002200040245007300062260000900135300001500144362001200159520078500171650003000956650003400986650002301020650001501043773005101058908000601109909001001115999001701125952010701142180718b2011   xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d  aVita, Giuseppe Di  aCurbing corruption in public administration: A case study from Italy  c2011  ap.631-645.  ajul-sep  aThe aim of this article is to verify whether the historic sentence, no. 500/1999 of the Italian Legitimacy Court (Corte di Cassazione) in Plenary Session, may have contributed to diminshing bribery in Italy, by increasing the area of liability for both civil servants and the public administration.  The empirical analysis is based on a case study conducted in Sicily, in the province of Catania, using a unique data set.  The main results of the article are: paying bureaucrats by means of an incentive wage regimes may not be effective in reducing corruption; an extension of the liablity rule for the public administration and civil servants may discourage the phenomenon of bribery; and, the perfect specification o f property rights helps to reduced corruption. - Reproduced.  aCorruption - Case studies  aPublic administration - Italy  aCorruption - Italy  aCorruption  aInternational Journal of Public Administration  aN  a94212  c94212d94212  00104070aIIPAbIIPAd2018-07-19hVolume no: 34, Issue no: 8-11pAR94672r2018-07-19w2018-07-19yAR