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Sources of inaction in household finance: Evidence from the Danish mortgage market

By: Adersen, S., Campbell, J.Y. and Ramadorai, T.
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookPublisher: The American Economic Review Description: 110(10), Oct, 2020: p.3184-3230.Subject(s): Household finance, Danish mortgage market, Mortgage market In: The American Economic ReviewSummary: We build an empirical model to attribute delays in mortgage refinancing to psychological costs inhibiting refinancing until incentives are sufficiently strong; and behavior, potentially attributable to information-gathering costs, lowering the probability of household refinancing per unit time at any incentive. We estimate the model on administrative panel data from Denmark, where mortgage refinancing without cash-out is unconstrained. Middle-aged and wealthy households act as if they have high psychological refinancing costs; but older, poorer, and less-educated households refinance with lower probability irrespective of incentives, thereby achieving lower savings. We use the model to understand frictions in the mortgage channel of monetary policy transmission. – Reproduced
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Articles Articles Indian Institute of Public Administration
110(10), Oct, 2020: p.3184-3230 Available AR124619

We build an empirical model to attribute delays in mortgage refinancing to psychological costs inhibiting refinancing until incentives are sufficiently strong; and behavior, potentially attributable to information-gathering costs, lowering the probability of household refinancing per unit time at any incentive. We estimate the model on administrative panel data from Denmark, where mortgage refinancing without cash-out is unconstrained. Middle-aged and wealthy households act as if they have high psychological refinancing costs; but older, poorer, and less-educated households refinance with lower probability irrespective of incentives, thereby achieving lower savings. We use the model to understand frictions in the mortgage channel of monetary policy transmission. – Reproduced

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