Bitcoin: An axiomatic approach and an impossibility theorem
By: Leshno, Jacob D. and Strack, Philipp
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: The American Economic Review: Insights Description: 2(3), Sep, 2020: p.269-286.Subject(s): Cryptocurrencies, Blockchains
In:
The American Economic Review: InsightsSummary: Bitcoin's main innovation lies in allowing a decentralized system that relies on anonymous, profit-driven miners who can freely join the system. We formalize these properties in three axioms: anonymity of miners, no incentives for miners to consolidate, and no incentive to assuming multiple fake identities. This novel axiomatic formalization allows us to characterize what other protocols are feasible: every protocol with these properties must have the same reward scheme as Bitcoin. This implies an impossibility result for risk-averse miners. Furthermore, any protocol either gives up on some degree of decentralization or its reward scheme is equivalent to Bitcoin's. - Reproduced
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 2(3), Sep, 2020: p.269-286 | Available | AR124697 |
Bitcoin's main innovation lies in allowing a decentralized system that relies on anonymous, profit-driven miners who can freely join the system. We formalize these properties in three axioms: anonymity of miners, no incentives for miners to consolidate, and no incentive to assuming multiple fake identities. This novel axiomatic formalization allows us to characterize what other protocols are feasible: every protocol with these properties must have the same reward scheme as Bitcoin. This implies an impossibility result for risk-averse miners. Furthermore, any protocol either gives up on some degree of decentralization or its reward scheme is equivalent to Bitcoin's. - Reproduced
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