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Sword of Damocles hanging over grassroots cadres in China: Understanding the accountability in campaign-style enforcement

By: Qian, Xingyu and Yao, Yangguang.
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookPublisher: International Sociology Description: 39(4), Jul, 2024: p.422-444.Subject(s): Accountability, Campaign-style enforcement, Grassroots cadres, Political mobilization, Target responsibility system In: International SociologySummary: The ‘campaign-style enforcement’ is a forceful policy instrument employed by Chinese authorities to address emergencies and intractable issues. However, the accountability embedded in campaign-style enforcement is largely overlooked, leading to the unclear dynamics of political mobilization at the grassroots level. While prior studies suggest that cadres in China are primarily motivated by promotion opportunities based on their political performance, this study, through a grounded-theory approach involving 557 penalized cadres in Hubei Province, argues that grassroots cadres are more likely mobilized by the stringent accountability system rather than by career promotion. Furthermore, this research develops a theoretical framework to elucidate what conditions may trigger accountability and how it drives grassroots political mobilization in the campaign-style enforcement.- Reproduced https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/02685809241230865
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Articles Articles Indian Institute of Public Administration
39(4), Jul, 2024: p.422-444 Available AR132993

The ‘campaign-style enforcement’ is a forceful policy instrument employed by Chinese authorities to address emergencies and intractable issues. However, the accountability embedded in campaign-style enforcement is largely overlooked, leading to the unclear dynamics of political mobilization at the grassroots level. While prior studies suggest that cadres in China are primarily motivated by promotion opportunities based on their political performance, this study, through a grounded-theory approach involving 557 penalized cadres in Hubei Province, argues that grassroots cadres are more likely mobilized by the stringent accountability system rather than by career promotion. Furthermore, this research develops a theoretical framework to elucidate what conditions may trigger accountability and how it drives grassroots political mobilization in the campaign-style enforcement.- Reproduced

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/02685809241230865

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