Entrenchment or retrenchment: The political economy of mortgage debt subsidies in the united states and Germany
By: Reisenbichler, Alexander
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Material type:
BookPublisher: Comparative Politics Description: 55(4), Jul, 2022: p.717-740.Subject(s): Mortagage debt, Political economy| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 55(4), Jul, 2022: p.717-740 | Available | AR131788 |
Why do mortgage subsidies vary across countries? Until the 2000s, the U.S. and Germany provided large-scale subsidies for homeownership. Yet, their paths diverged when they faced deep economic crises at that time. While the U.S. doubled down on government support by quasi-nationalizing its mortgage market, Germany retrenched homeowner subsidies. This article argues that growth regimes shape coalitional logics that explain these contrasting outcomes. In the U.S. demand-led regime, where housing is key to growth, a bipartisan coalition entrenched mortgage subsidies to stimulate household credit and consumption. Germany's export-led regime, where housing is less central to growth, produced a broad-based coalition that retrenched homeowner subsidies to boost competitiveness. Detailed case studies contrast the quasi-nationalization of U.S. government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) with the retrenchment of the German "homeowner subsidy" (Eigenheimzulage).- Reproduced
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