Multigame contact: A double-edged sword for cooperation
By: Laferrière, Vincent et al
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Material type: 
BookPublisher: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Description: 16(2). May, 2024: p.39-61.Subject(s): Multigame contact, Cooperation behavior, Prisoner’s dilemma, Experimental design, Repeated interaction, Partner pairing, Game theory, Behavioral outcomes, Linked decisions, Mutual cooperation, Mutual defection, Strategic behavior, Theoretical prediction, Double-edged effect, Decision linkage, Experimental economics, Interaction structure, Cooperation dynamics, Subject behavior, Game-based study
In:
American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsSummary: We study experimentally the effect of multigame contact on cooperation, with each subject playing a pair of indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas. Multigame contact is present if a subject plays both games with a single partner, and it is absent if each of the two games is played with a different partner. In contrast to the theoretical prediction, multigame contact does not increase overall cooperation rates. Nonetheless, multigame contact systematically affects behavior and outcomes, acting like a double-edged sword, in the sense that subjects link decisions across games and, consequently, mutual cooperation and mutual defection in both games become more likely.- Reproduced
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20210377
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | 16(2). May, 2024: p.39-61 | Available | AR132572 |
We study experimentally the effect of multigame contact on cooperation, with each subject playing a pair of indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas. Multigame contact is present if a subject plays both games with a single partner, and it is absent if each of the two games is played with a different partner. In contrast to the theoretical prediction, multigame contact does not increase overall cooperation rates. Nonetheless, multigame contact systematically affects behavior and outcomes, acting like a double-edged sword, in the sense that subjects link decisions across games and, consequently, mutual cooperation and mutual defection in both games become more likely.- Reproduced
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20210377
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