Contingent reasoning and dynamic public goods provision
By: Calford, Evan M. and Cason, Timothy N
.
Material type: 
BookPublisher: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Description: 16(2). May, 2024: p.236-266.Subject(s): Public goods, Contribution behavior, Contingent reasoning, Dynamic decisions, Static decisions, Information revelation, Equilibrium analysis, Partially cursed individuals, Contingent events, Nash players, Behavioral experiment, Future inference, Past inference, Concurrent inference, Provision mechanism, Contribution levels, Strategic thinking, Experimental economics, Welfare implications, Collective action
In:
American Economic Journal: MicroeconomicsSummary: Contributions toward public goods often reveal information that is useful to others considering their own contributions. This experiment compares static and dynamic contribution decisions to determine how contingent reasoning differs in dynamic decisions where equilibrium requires understanding how future information can inform about prior events. This identifies partially cursed individuals who can only extract partial information from contingent events, others who are better at extracting information from past rather than future or concurrent events, and Nash players who effectively perform contingent thinking. Contrary to equilibrium, the dynamic provision mechanism does not lead to lower contributions than the static mechanism.- Reproduced
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20220111
| Item type | Current location | Call number | Vol info | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Articles
|
Indian Institute of Public Administration | 16(2). May, 2024: p.236-266 | Available | AR132578 |
Contributions toward public goods often reveal information that is useful to others considering their own contributions. This experiment compares static and dynamic contribution decisions to determine how contingent reasoning differs in dynamic decisions where equilibrium requires understanding how future information can inform about prior events. This identifies partially cursed individuals who can only extract partial information from contingent events, others who are better at extracting information from past rather than future or concurrent events, and Nash players who effectively perform contingent thinking. Contrary to equilibrium, the dynamic provision mechanism does not lead to lower contributions than the static mechanism.- Reproduced
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mic.20220111
There are no comments for this item.