Professional autonomy and the cost of legal aid
By: Gray, Alastair.
Contributor(s): Fenn, Paul | Rickman, Neil.
Material type:
ArticlePublisher: 1999Description: p.545-58.Subject(s): Legal aid
In:
Oxford Economic PapersSummary: This paper considers whether lawyers, acting as agents, respond to financial incentives which are extraneous to their clients' requirements. We take as a case study lawyers performing legal aid work in England and Wales. An empirical model of legal aid expenditure variations across areas in relation to changes in the demand for conveyancing services and the structure of the industry is estimated using dynamic panel data methods. The results may help to explain rising government legal aid expenditure in recent years. - Reproduced
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Articles
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Indian Institute of Public Administration | Volume no: 51, Issue no: 3 | Available | AR42031 |
This paper considers whether lawyers, acting as agents, respond to financial incentives which are extraneous to their clients' requirements. We take as a case study lawyers performing legal aid work in England and Wales. An empirical model of legal aid expenditure variations across areas in relation to changes in the demand for conveyancing services and the structure of the industry is estimated using dynamic panel data methods. The results may help to explain rising government legal aid expenditure in recent years. - Reproduced
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