000			01501pab a2200181 454500
008			180718b2013 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aKwon, Osung
245			_aFiscal decentralization: An effective tool for government reform?
260			_c2013
300			_ap.544-560.
520			_aThe theory of fiscal federalism asserts that fiscal decentralization increases government effectiveness, reduces government budgets, and reduces corruption when used as a means of government reform. However, counter-arguments have been made that such an approach has diverging effects according to the level of national development. We have attempted herein to carry out an empirical analysis to examine these theories. Data from 17 developed and 17 developing states were obtained in order to conduct a regression analysis of various indicators. The results revealed that fiscal decentralization reduced government effectiveness in developed countries. Important determinants for government effectiveness were the quality of regulation and the rule of law. When responsibility for expenditure and revenue were devolved, budgets expanded in both developed and developing countries. Fiscal decentralization deterred corruption in advanced states, whereas greater autonomy in spending increased malfeasance in the developing world. - Reproduced.
650			_aAdministrative reform
650			_aDecentralization
650			_aFinance
773			_aPublic Administration
908			_aN
909			_a101699
999			_c101697 _d101697