000			01541pab a2200169 454500
008			180718b2013 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aLee, JongKon
245			_aThe administrative broker: Bureaucratic politics in the era of prevalent information
260			_c2013
300			_ap.690-708.
362			_aNov
520			_aAlthough traditional models of bureaucratic politics have relied on the old assumption that information is expensive, information is prevalent nowadays; the monopoly of bureaucratic expertise has been undermined as interest groups have significantly developed and are professionalized. As a result, what is really important in current bureaucratic politics is not just neutral expertise, but the political capacity to affect the behaviors of information sources. Through mediating conflicts of interest and minimizing unnecessary contingencies, agencies can persuade their stakeholders not to provide information to legislators and, therefore, indirectly affect legislators' decisions on delegation and oversight. Different from traditional principal-agent theories, this article suggests the "administrative broker" model in which politically influential agencies can block information leakage to legislators and enhance their own discretion. Moreover, the administrative brokers occasionally transform traditionally hostile principal-agent relations into more favorable ones. - Reproduced.
650			_aBureaucracy
773			_aAmerican Review of Public Administration
908			_aN
909			_a103251
999			_c103247 _d103247