000			01563pab a2200181 454500
008			180718b2014 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBiela, Jan
245			_aThe empirical assessment of agency accountability: A regime approach and an application to the German Bundesnetzagentur
260			_c2014
300			_ap.362-381.
362			_aJun
520			_aRegulation has in many cases been delegated to independent agencies, which has led to the question of how democratic accountability of these agencies in ensured. There are few empirical approaches to agency accountability. We offer such an approach, resting upon three propositions. First, we scrutinize agency accountability both de jure (accountability is ensured by formal rights of accountability 'fora' to receive information and impose consequences) and de facto (the capability of fora to use these rights depends on resources and decision costs that affect the credibility of their sanctioning capacity). Second, accountability must be evaluated separately at political, operational and managerial levels. And third, at each level accountability is enacted by a system of several (partially) interdependent for a, forming together an accountability regime. The proposed framework is applied to the case of the German Bundesnetzogentur's accountability regime, which shows its suitability for empirical purposes. - Reproduced.
650			_aAccountability
700			_aPapadopoulos, Yannis
773			_aInternational Review of Administrative Sciences
908			_aN
909			_a104504
999			_c104500 _d104500