000			01251pab a2200193 454500
008			180718b2014 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aAtkinson, Michael M.
245			_aWhy do governments use pay for performance? Contrasting theories and interview evidence
260			_c2014
300			_ap.436-458.
362			_aSep
520			_aIn Canada, pay-for-performance (PFP) systems to compensate senior public servants have been established in several jurisdictions despite arguments by academics who doubt their efficacy in public sector environments characterized by high levels of intrinsic motivation. This article traces the pattern of PFP in Canada and distinguishes among ﾓaggressive,ﾔ ﾓpassive,ﾔ and ﾓreluctantﾔ regimes. It explores why PFP is growing in popularity despite its acknowledged limitations. We canvass three theoretical perspectives and review evidence from interviews with key officials in a number of jurisdictions. The article contributes to our knowledge of managerial innovations by revealing the variety of motivations behind PFP. -
650			_aPerformance appriasal
700			_aKim, Boa
700			_aFulton, Murray
773			_aCanadian Public Administration
908			_aN
909			_a106491
999			_c106486 _d106486