000			01676pab a2200205 454500
008			180718b2014 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aHaque, Mohammad Ashraful
245			_aAccountability for public expenditure in Bangladesh: the principal-agent problem and role of the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General
260			_c2014
300			_ap.249-260.
362			_aDec
520			_aWhile administrative accountability is a key to good governance, there is a dilemma concerning which aspects of it should be given special emphasis. This dilemma arises in part from the alternative perspectives of bureaucratic management and principal-agent theory. The former provides for accountability through hierarchical control, written rules and procedures, and bureaucratic impersonality. The latter, by contrast, heralds the value of contractual relationships and the resulting incentives that lead actors to respond in particular ways. This article addresses these perspectives with reference to the public expenditure accountability system in Bangladesh as a principal-agent problem between the executive, bureaucracy and the parliament. A significant element of the problem is that the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General has limited capacity to enhance the flow of credible public financial information as a means of reducing the information asymmetry between principals and agents. - Reproduced.
650			_aCAG - Bangladesh
650			_aAccountability - Bangladesh
650			_aPublic expenditure - Bangladesh
650			_aPublic expenditure
773			_aAsia Pacific Journal of Public Administration
908			_aN
909			_a107024
999			_c107019 _d107019