000			01436pab a2200169 454500
008			180718b2015 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aFeldman, Daniel L.
245			_aThe legitimacy of U.S. government agency power
260			_c2015
300			_ap.75-84.
362			_aJan-Feb
520			_aA synthesis of the work of two political and legal scholars, John Rohr and Lon Fuller, properly balances constitutional and managerial values, supplementing other theories that offer useful but insufficient support for American government agency legitimacy. Agencies reflecting that balance would strengthen their legitimacy a particularly valuable goal in an era of low confidence in American government. Rohr's focus on the constitutional oath of office and American regime values, and Fuller's insistence that law must serve human needs, leave a great deal indeterminate and discretionary but nevertheless set boundaries. Bureaucrats who risked or sacrificed their jobs to avoid transgressing those boundaries offer models of loyalty to the Rohr-Fuller balance of values. The behavior of officials in the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in thwarting measures that could have averted the financial crisis of 2007 offers a model of bureaucrats who violated those boundaries. - Reproduced.
650			_aCivil service - Unite States
650			_aCivil service
773			_aPublic Administration Review
909			_a108333
999			_c108328 _d108328