000			01505pab a2200217 454500
008			180718b2015 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBonoli, Giuliano
245			_aFederalism and welfare to work in Switzerland: the development of active social policies in a fragmented welfare state
260			_c2015
300			_ap.77-98.
362			_aWinter
520			_aThis article is concerned with the impact that federal structures have on the development of welfare to work or activation policies. More precisely, it argues that the incentives and the risks associated with a division of responsibilities among different jurisdictions may constitute an obstacle to broad reforms that promote labor market participation of nonworking benefit recipients. This argument is illustrated with a case study discussing policy responses to a massive rise in caseloads among social assistance recipients in Switzerland. We conclude that the lack of a fundamental reform was the consequence of the incentives provided by the federal structure of the program. These incentives have both encouraged cost shifting among jurisdictions and discouraged involvement of federal level policy makers in a bigger reform. - Reproduced.
650			_aWelfare state - Switzerland
650			_aSocial policy
650			_aSwitzerland - Social policy
650			_aFederalism - Switzerland
650			_aFederalism
700			_aChampion, Cyrielle
773			_aPublius: the Journal of Fedrealism
909			_a108537
999			_c108532 _d108532