000			01338pab a2200181 454500
008			180718b2015 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aBertelli, Anthony M
245			_aMass administrative reorganization, media attention, and the paradox of information
260			_c2015
300			_ap.855-866.
362			_aNov-Dec
520			_aHow does media attention influence government decisions about whether to terminate independent administrative agencies? The authors argue that an agency's salience with partisan audiences has a direct effect, but a high media profile can disrupt normal government monitoring processes and obfuscate termination decisions. This argument is evaluated in the context of a recent mass administrative reorganization by the British coalition government using probit and heteroscedastic probit regression models. The evidence suggests that termination is less likely for agencies salient in newspapers popular with the government's core supporters but not those read by its minority coalition partner. We also find that agencies with greater overall newspaper salience as well as younger agencies have a higher error variance. - Reproduced.
650			_aMass media
650			_aAdministrative reform
700			_aSinclair, J. Andrew
773			_aPublic Administration Review
909			_a109843
999			_c109838 _d109838