000			01568pab a2200169 454500
008			180718b2016 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aCook, Brian J.
245			_aCuring the mischiefs of faction in the American administrative state
260			_c2016
300			_ap.3-27.
362			_aJan
520			_aThe worries American citizens express about the distorting influence of minority factions, or special interests, on public governance are as old as the republic. I briefly recount the constitutional design flaws and developmental changes that have combined to make these worries more valid than ever in an age of administratively centered governance. I then review the evidence on the nature and extent of special interest influence on the administrative process from a broad swath of scholarship. After noting the limited efficacy of attempts to limit special interest influence via minor tinkering with the separation of powers, I argue for more fundamental structural change in the form of administration as a separate, constitutionally recognized element of the separation of powers. I outline basic structural features and offer hypothetical yet plausible consequences of such a design change. The latter, I contend, are amenable to confirmation or refutation through systematic analysis of evidence that is already available from past and current governing experience. - Reproduced.
650			_aPublic administration - United States
650			_aPublic administration
773			_aAmerican Review of Public Administration
909			_a110869
999			_c110864 _d110864