000			01392pab a2200157 454500
008			180718b2016 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aJames, Oliver et al
245			_aThe politics of agency death: ministers and the survival of government agencies in a parliamentary system
260			_c2016
300			_ap.763-784.
362			_aOct
520			_aThis article extends the theory of government agency survival from separation of powers to parliamentary government systems. It evaluates expectations of increased risk to agencies following transitions in government, prime minister or departmental minister, and from incongruence between the originally establishing and currently overseeing political executive. Using survival models for UK executive agencies between 1989 and 2012, the study finds that politics trumps performance. Ministers seek to make their mark by terminating agencies created by previous ministers, which is reinforced by high media attention to the agency. Performance against agency targets is not associated with higher termination risk, and replacement agencies do not perform any better than those that were terminated. Financial autonomy provides some protection for agencies that are less dependent on budgetary appropriations. - Reproduced.
650			_aPolitics and government
773			_aBritish Journal of Political Science
909			_a112661
999			_c112656 _d112656