000			01495pab a2200157 454500
008			180718b2016 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
100			_aSundstrom, Aksel
245			_aViolence and the costs of honesty: rethinking bureaucrat's choices to take bribes
260			_c2016
300			_ap.593-608.
362			_aSep
520			_aExplanations of bureaucrats' decisions to take bribes include accounts of incentives as well as expectations. However, there are further considerations in violent contexts, where refusal of bribes may have dire consequences. Yet, insight into this topic is limited. This article investigates how violence upholds bribery, through interviews with South African officials who enforce regulations in communities where gangs operate. The investigation shows that when citizens offer bribes to enable rule violations, this is a process of both temptation and threats: officials who refuse bribes face intimidation by both citizens and colluding colleagues. This illustrates how violence may function as a mechanism to enforce corrupt contracts between bureaucrats and criminal citizens. Through reducing costs in such settings, bribe-taking is partly a strategy of social protection. This has implications for policy and suggests that, besides incentives and expectations, administrative reforms may benefit from 'fixing the security' of bureaucrats in violent contexts. - Reproduced.
650			_aCivil service
773			_aPublic Administration
909			_a112695
999			_c112690 _d112690